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Show me the money: The ethics of physicians’
income
James W. Jones, MD, PhD, MHA, Laurence B. McCullough, PhD and Bruce W. Richman, MA,
Houston, TexIf all economists were laid end to end, they would not reach
a conclusion.
George Bernard Shaw
It has been 40 years since enactment of the first
Medicare legislation and 22 years since the concept of
diagnosisrelated groups, which changed the financial
complexion ofmedical practice forever. Since then, reduc-
tions and delays in reimbursement by thirdparty payers,
everrising costs, and an unending proliferation of costly
regulations and pressures by accrediting bodies and gov-
ernment agencies have been visited on us like the plagues
upon Egypt. Are we right to object, and how should we
ethically respond to the effect these measures have had on
physicians’ incomes?
A. Society is trying to ratchet down the cost of medical care
while expecting constant improvement in medical sci-
ence, technology, procedures, and life expectancy. Tell
your patients that this is unfair to physicians.
B. Political promises of lowcost medical care cannot be
met. Influence the political system by opposing all can-
didates unsympathetic to physician interests.
C. Stop accepting Medicare and Medicaid patients, and do
not enter preferred provider contracts with private in-
surers who will fix your rates at discounted prices.
D. Compensate for lost revenue by performing more bill-
able procedures and scheduling more appointments for
your patients to increase your total charges to Medicare
and private insurers.
E. Continue to base your practice on the best available
clinical evidence, and strictly limit your interventions to
indicated treatment.
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doi:10.1016/j.jvs.2005.05.018Frequent readers of these pages have encountered reg-
ular advocacy of the physician’s fiduciary relationship with
patients as the most effective method of treatment and as
the basis for medical ethics. That fiduciary relationship
requires the physician to place the patient’s clinical needs
before the physician’s self-interest in professional advance-
ment, convenience, or personal compensation. The ethical
requirement that the patient must come first does not,
however, mean that the physician’s individual needs cannot
come next or that the physician has no legitimate entitle-
ment to the fruit of his or her labor. Only a relatively few in
any culture can satisfy the requirements of superior intel-
lect, hard work, technical skill, dedication, compassion, and
ethical sensibility essential to the physician’s function. Few
indeed have as long a period of preparation or contribute as
much to their societies as physicians, and it is meet and
proper that their compensation is calculated accordingly.
Medicine remains a relatively lucrative profession for most
practitioners despite recent annoyances, and most of us
earn everything we make.
For almost three decades after the conclusion of World
War II, the United States experienced unprecedented an-
nual economic growth rates, primarily because the indus-
trial capacities of our potential European and Asian com-
petitors had been destroyed by more than half a decade of
total war. With the reconstitution of foreign industry and
development of a global market economy after the end of
the Cold War, the US growth rate slowed to a solid but less
robust annual pace. Business became increasingly cost-
conscious, and wage expansion slowed. American corpo-
rate and individual tax payers put increasing pressure on the
government to contain and reduce taxes. First the Medicare
system and then private health insurance plans put down-
ward pressure on physician reimbursement. Physicians re-
sponded to the reductions with a variety of strategies to
maintain a status quo that had traditionally been very
friendly to them.
Predictably, medical economists began to interpret the
medical profession’s defensive maneuvers as lapses in finan-
cial integrity.1 There certainly was, and perhaps remains,
enough verifiable fraud in Medicare billing by physicians to
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that, two kinds of large-scale medical economic studies lay
at the base of their doubts about how doctors behaved, and
subsequently became major influences in the drive to lower
physician reimbursements. One of them operated from a
thoroughly false premise and naturally reached faulty con-
clusions, and the other entangled itself in a paralyzing
paradox.
The first of these two study methods is the small area
variation (SAV). Economic studies of SAV tended to look
skeptically upon geographic differences in units of care per
population, which, as a matter of convenience, usually
counted easily numerated medical procedures as their units
of measure. Economists were shocked to find that in some
counties in the United States and Canadian provinces (their
units of geographic distinction) markedly more medical
procedures of a particular type were performed than others.
Studies in New England over three decades ago that
showed that twice the number of hysterectomies were done
from town to town introduced the methodology.2 Later
investigators often found, after adjusting for age, disease
prevalence, sex, and economic status, that some regions
showed persistent variations in procedural incidence. A
study of 44,000 myocardial infarction patients in 95 se-
lected regions found statistically significant SAVs in the
number of patients in each area who had received angio-
grams.3 One geographic region had a 10-fold incidence of
tympanostomy tube insertion over other supposedly
matched regions.4 Hundreds of other articles by medical
economists over the years confirmed patterns of geographic
variation in the incidence of medical procedures per popu-
lation. The economists controlled for many demographic
variables, but they missed the most important ones, and of
course the resultant conclusion was deeply flawed.
The conclusion that the economists reached and passed
on to governmental and private third-party payers was that
the frequency of SAVs indicated prescription by doctors of
excessive, expensive, and unindicated treatment in the
high-frequency procedure areas. They further concluded
that the data proved that procedural medicine, of which the
surgical specialties were the most prominent practitioners,
was fat and ripe for cutting. Their premises and conclusions
were wrong because their adjusted variables made inade-
quate distinctions between areas such as rural counties with
a single bare-bones hospital and major urban centers. In a
study of 19,000 patients having knee replacements, coun-
ties with more medical school–affiliated beds had signifi-
cantly higher rates.5 The economists’ main parameter was
only the number of adjusted procedures per capita, without
much allowance for the local ease of access to the proce-
dures being considered or the likelihood of referral to
another county with greater expertise. All these and the
other complex cases were of course referred to the fully
equipped private clinics or medical schools, and the in-
creased procedural workload in their counties was then
interpreted as irresponsible profligacy.
The second of the medical economists’ major areas of
study was supplier (physician)-induced demand. Procedur-ally, much like the auto mechanic, whom we all suspect of
black-hearted corruption, the physician advises a substan-
tially naive and anxious clientele of what is wrong and then
what the physician will do to fix it. Because the physician
effectively controls both the demand and the supply side of
the economic equation, the environment fairly invites an
expansive interpretation of the problem.
Economists developed and studied the target-income
model of physician-induced demand early in Medicare’s
fee-regulation era. As fees were decreased by Medicare
managers, physicians did in fact compensate by increasing
their services to Medicare patients, enough to replace from
40%6 to 70%7 of lost income. Medical care consumption in
the more lucrative private insurance sector was also in-
creased during this period, perhaps to an even greater
degree, as doctors scrambled to catch up.6 When physicians
were not making additional interventions to compensate
for the lowered profitability of some Medicare-targeted
procedures, they made up the difference by applying their
time to something else. A 10% decrease in Medicare’s
physician payments for cataract removal caused a 5% in-
crease in the incidence of noncataract procedures.8 In a
community that fluoridated its water, dentists compensated
for the reduction in corrective dental services by increasing
their even more lucrative restorative work.9 Correctly read-
ing the implications of continued reductions in Medicare
fees in a physician-induced demand market, economists
advised Medicare governors that if physicians’ fees fell too
low, doctors would react by increasing the number of
procedures and other billable encounters among all their
patients and ultimately raise the overall national cost of
medical care.10
When increased utilization of angiography was exam-
ined according to guidelines proposed by the College of
Cardiology, the increase was in the group in which angiog-
raphy was useful and effective and not in the unindicated
group.11 Certainly, the overall consumption of care is in-
fluenced significantly by many factors beyond physician
manipulation of the market. As medicine becomes more
successful in prolonging life, the general population in-
creases, grows older, and requires continuing care. A sig-
nificant rise in the number of patients treated does a lot
more to increase the total cost of medical care than an
increase in physicians’ fees would by itself. Improved
screening methods such as mammography, advanced imag-
ing, colonoscopy, and various batched screening laboratory
tests all create new costs in and of themselves and by
identifying disease processes which then require treatment.
Public education programs encourage people to ask their
doctors for these studies. Preventive care has been shown to
be effective in reducing subsequent high-cost morbidities,
ranging from dental care to vascular procedures.12,13 Early
in the 21st century, preventive medical care is neither well
scripted nor universalized. Medical care utilization obeys
ancient economic laws of consumption: it falls as its cost to
the patient rises,13 giving little incentive for patients in our
present third-party payor system to limit their requests.
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surgeons committed to preserving their elevated financial
status have responded creatively with questionable ethics to
reduced reimbursements from third-party payers. When
physicians permit economic self-interest to eclipse fiduciary
responsibility and professional integrity, they become more
likely to offer, recommend, and perform diagnostic and
therapeutic services for which clinical indications are mar-
ginal. Surgical overtreatment, in particular, is not benign.
As costly and painful as it is to patients, it is deadly to
professional integrity and public trust in our profession. As
early as the mid-18th century, medical ethicist John Greg-
ory foresaw that unscrupulous physicians could enrich
themselves by exploiting the worried well, indulging their
anxieties with frequent office visits and abundant medical
procedures, and ultimately create an actual threat rather
than a benefit to their patients’ health, as well as to doctors’
professionalism. Gregory urged physicians to understand
that their best long-term personal and professional interest
lay in honoring their fiduciary responsibility, observing an
ethical standard of care in treating patients, and building
community trust in the profession’s knowledge, effective-
ness, and integrity.14
Option A invites patients to respond sympathetically to
their doctors’ complaints of reduced economic circum-
stances and, perhaps, to gladly take a greater proportion of
the physician’s compensation upon themselves. There is a
subtly coercive element in such an approach—an implica-
tion that the patient’s stated agreement is required if he is to
continue to receive the doctor’s best effort in treating him.
Patients are unlikely to spontaneously respond sympathet-
ically to the personal financial worries of physicians who,
they rightly believe, are in most cases far more affluent than
themselves. Option A should be rejected as potentially
unethical at worst and unseemly at best.
As the data we have cited support, physicians do indeed
bear considerable responsibility for the amount of medical
care. Asking the political system alone to save physicians
denies their own poor practice, ultimately shifts the bur-
dens of these costs to others in the society, evades respon-
sibility for correcting problems internal to the medical
profession, and does nothing to improve the quality or
availability of care. Option B should be rejected.
Option C must be rejected as unethical because if
widespread, it would deprive needy elderly and poor pa-
tients of access to technically superior care. As a business
decision, it would surely be disastrous; vascular surgery is
substantially a geriatric specialty supported by Medicare.
The distal bypasses, carotid endarterectomies, and aneurys-
mectomies that are the bread and butter of a vascular
surgical practice are seldom needed by any but elderly
patients who rely on Medicare to cover their costs. Private
insurers with whom you decline discounted contracts sim-
ply advise their patients that they should seek other provid-
ers to maximize their coverage.
Option D subjects patients to the serious risks of over-
treatment, diminishes the physician’s professionalism, andis in many cases grossly illegal. It is to be rejected as the
most unethical of the choices offered.
Option E, continuing to practice surgery on the basis of
scientific evidence, clinical indications, fiduciary responsi-
bility, and empathic regard for the genuine needs of pa-
tients, remains the best response to the forces that have
buffeted medicine. Your long and difficult years of training,
the knowledge and skill you have acquired through hard
and dedicated work, and the enormous good that you do
within your community have indeed earned you the oppor-
tunity to make a comfortable and secure living. They have
not earned any of us the right to game the system, mistreat
patients, or take more than we have earned. The culture
continues to hold us in high esteem and compensate us well
substantially because it still trusts us to behave ethically and
empathically and to serve our patients’ interests before our
own. When any members of our profession overtreat and
sicken our patients to feather our own nests, we all risk
losing the trust of our fellow humans.
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